On Wed, 15 Feb 2012 18:08:51 -0800, "Michael J. Mahon"
<mjmahon@aol.com> wrote:
Mike Maginnis wrote:
On 2012-02-15 10:12:24 +0000, Michael J. Mahon said:
David Schmidt <schmidtd@my-deja.com> wrote:
On 2/14/2012 10:00 AM, Michael Black wrote:
[...]
But I don't see what great new development happened with the III that
helped the II line along. It was a separate branch, the never went
further. Unless the failure of the III meant Apple went back to
extending the II line in a more logical fashion.
The 80-column firmware was transplanted from the III to the IIe. As
Brendan pointed out, ProDOS is a direct descendant of SOS.
Yes, but these are both natural evolutionary developments that would have
occurred on any Apple II follow-on.
Apple tried to design a new machine for the business market and
discovered
that what the market really wanted (besides IBM PCs) was an Apple II with
additional business features--like a lower-case-capable keyboard, an
80-column display, a clock-calendar, and a DOS with mass-storage
capabilities. (All of which had been delivered (suboptimally) by the
Apple
II aftermarket!)
In 1981, I used to attend an Apple user group in Austin, TX, and several
members had Apple ///'s. I found it ironic that they were almost all used
in ][+ emulation mode (except when running the /// demo software)!
-michael - NadaNet 3.1 and AppleCrate II:
http://home.comcast.net/~mjmahon
Interesting, considering how crippled the emulation mode was. The ///
didn't catch on in the market due to the well-documented technical
issues and lack of usable software resulting from a stupidly shortened
QA cycle, not because is wasn't a II.
I certainly don't disagree that the /// was permanently hobbled by
poor design and execution issues.
But by the time that the /// was released into the wild, the II already
had developed a pretty robust infrastructure and following. Lots of
great programs, lots of workable hardware extensions, and lots of users
anxious to make it do anything that people wanted to do.
Introducing a new computer architecture into this environment was a
serious matter, and Apple chose to play the "proprietary" and "chosen
developers" game instead of letting the market do whatever it wanted,
as happened with the II.
The result was a slower growth of software, hardware, and market
share, just as the II was accelerating like crazy.
Even if the hardware of the /// had been perfect, I think it would have
been a "one trick pony", and would never have garnered enough market
share to be a successful product against the IBM juggernaut.
-michael
NadaNet 3.1 for Apple II parallel computing!
Home page: http://home.comcast.net/~mjmahon/
"The wastebasket is our most important design
tool--and it's seriously underused."
While I agree that even had it been perfect out of the gate, the ///
would have had trouble competing against IBM, I doubt that many would
have still chosen the II over the /// for a business desktop.
When Apple finally got around to releasing the revised /// in late
'81, which is what it should have been to begin with, sales of that
model jumped to 5,000 a month from the 500 it had been previously. Had
the ///'s reputation not been ruined by that point, it likely would
have been even more. Woz was probably right when he joked that they
should have renamed it the Apple IV when it was re-introduced.
We're playing a what-if game here, but I see little evidence that
businesses were choosing the II/II Plus over the /// for any reason
other than ///s technical failings.
Software growth was hampered by developers taking a "wait-and-see"
attitude after all the bugs of the first ///. Apple's shortened
development cycle and constantly changing tech specs made it hard for
internal software development to make any headway. For exampe Pascal,
the first language other than Business BASIC (and assembly) to ship
for the /// didn't arrive until around the time the revised ///
appeared, and hardware development suffered similarly.
Mike Maginnis