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Re: Apple IIx



Rubywand <rubywand@swbell.net> wrote:

>Forrest writes ...
>> 
>> Rubywand wrote:
>> 
>> >As you say, the Apple II and its user base was still in good shape
>> >in 1984. Even so, the II series certainly was not "hot".
>> 
>> In 1984 the II line sold 800,000 units, its best performance to that
>> date and possibly ever; according to the February 1985 issue of
>> Personal Computing it sold well enough to retake the top spot in
>> market share that IBM had won for the first time the year before.
>
>     The simple fact is that established II users were aware of being 'in the
>doldrums' regarding hardware development. From the momement the PC arrived, we
>were aware that, obviously, the keyboard should be detached. The Mac was in
B&W;
>but, anyone could see that the high-res mouse & windows interface was way
ahead
>of ours. And, some of the clone PC's were showing very nice text displays
using
>fonts and colors.

Well, again if 8-bit compatibility were not an issue, I submit that based
on your definition, the Mac and the Apple II are the same.  Thus, if
the Mac had a high-res mouse and windows interface, those features
were "our" features!

But you are running around the argument.  If Apple IIs still outsold PCs
in 1984, when IIc feaver was hitting ("Apple II Forever"), Apple should
have seized the moment and instead of releasing an incompatible Mac,
released a "Mac IIGS" capable of running 8-bit software.  Compatibility
was a must issue.  If the Mac had 8-bit compatibility, then those
features would truly be our features.

>     You talk about 800,000 sales in 1984-- so what? How did this make our
>machines faster or increase graphics resolution? Remember, with the possible
>exception of double-hires, the Apple II series had not changed in any major
way
>since the II+. We still had the best game machine and plenty of new software;
>but, we were acutely aware of falling ever farther behind the leading edge.

It showed the user base was strong.  The way to keep it was to build
a sound and graphics demon, BUT it had to be backward compatible.
At least the first model had to be.

Not even IBM could push the user base from the importance of
compatibility.  Remember Microchannel Architecture in the PS/2
and how it ultimately failed?  It failed because the slots were not
compatible and IBM did not provide a transition to the new
architecture.  MCA was more advanced that the original PC
architecture too, but that in itself was not enough.  The user base
rebelled.

In the Apple world, graphics and sound would not be enough
either without some sort of transition platform that was at least
compatible with the old world in its initial model.

Previously, I wrote about how even though the Amiga 2000 had PC
killing sound and graphics in late 1988 and that it could actually
do the work of SGI workstations for the production of Babylon 5,
such features alone, no matter how superior to PCs, would not of
and in themselves win against the PC.

As for the IIGS, yes, new more powerful models could have
been made and where the Amiga 2000 failed, a "IIGS 2000"
would probably have succeeded precisely because the users
had their transition.  But advanced IIGS were not built, not
because advanced features and transitioning users conflicted,
but rather because Apple didn't want to build one to compete
against the mac.
 
>> >Apple had already committed its fatal bad business decision with
>> >release of the first 68xxx-based Mac. Yes; it was a cute, clever
>> >machine which sold well.
>> 
>> Not all that well:
>> 
>> "...the world around them was crumbling. Macintosh sales in September
>> [1984] were less than two-thirds of the 30,000 projected; October
>> sales were projected at 50,000 and came in below September's.
>> In November, after the October sales figures came in, Steve walked
>> into his regular Wednesday-afternoon staff meeting and cast a chill
>> across the room. The usual cocky dynamism was gone; he looked like a
>> man who'd been blind-sided by--fate, numbers, whatever.
>> I've failed, he announced. What's the price I have to pay?
>> What's the cost?"  [Frank Rose, _West of Eden_ p217]
>
>     Of course, the problem with niche markets is they dry up. That Jobs was
>gloomy about the drop in Mac sales is understandable-- at those prices and
>profits, anyone would be.
>
>     In fact, the //c was yet another reasonably successful product which
proved
>to be a disappointment. As with the Mac, the real disappointment was that the
>great mass of current and potential users had no interest in closed-box,
>non-expandable computers.

The initial Mac was a failure and did not improve until Jobs was removed
so that the system could be freed from his vision.  The IIc was a raging
success and even after all these years, it was an unqualified success.
The IIGS was a success too, but Apple killed it by cutting advertising and
R&D.  Otherwise, the II users would have continued to march forward
in force to the current day as an integrated user base.  I submit that the
features would have increased with each new model, just as Amiga
features increased.

>     Translation: Tricks are for kids; you're going to have to battle PC
>head-on. No major computer maker, including IBM, wanted to face the prospect
of
>matching rapidly developing PC clone features and cutthroat pricing.

I submit that the Amiga 2000 fills the criterea.  I don't remember how it
was priced, but I think the price actually went DOWN compared to the
Amiga 1000.  More than that, this was the computer that put the PC
of its day to shame.  Better sound and graphics.  You could generate
Babylon 5 CG on it!  They actually used it as a low cost substitute for
SGI machins.

So, kick butt graphics and features, hard drive and all, 1988.  The
Amiga 2000 had a mission to demolish the PC market by the sheer
force of features.

In the words of the Babylon 5 intro, "it failed."