Re: Apple the Strategy For next 10 years

[rubywand@aol.com (RUBYWAND)]

     Apple, Inc. continues to be interesting to II owners, especially
those who have been users since the late 70's/early 80's. In those days
there was fierce competition among devotees of Apple, Atari, TI, TRS-80,
OSI, and Commodore. We believed that we were in a 'war' to win the world
for our platform.

     By 1983, it was pretty clear that, in terms of the lion's share of
home users, we had won. 'The World' was Apple's for the taking. The II
series would continue to improve and Apple, Inc. would dictate home
computing standards into the 21st century.

     This did not happen. It came as a shock that Apple did not want the
World, that, instead, the company preferred to pursue quick high profits
in small, rich specialty markets.

     Incredibly, not one major computer maker seems to have understood
what so many users-- of Apple II's, of Commodore 64's, ...-- knew as a
matter of common sense: the home computing market is the center of power.
Dominate the home market with its millions of users and the other markets
must, eventually, be yours as well.

     In the fateful summer of 1985, II users were annoyed that Apple
failed to match the flashy new machines from Atari and Commodore; but,
there was, also, a collective sigh of relief. Both Atari and Commodore
delivered non-65XXX closed-box machines; thus, alienating many of their
own users and winning few converts among Apple II ranks. We were, after
all, still 'at war'.

     By 1987 some of us began to regret the colossal blunders of the
competition, including, even, IBM. The PC had, so to speak, "escaped
cultivation". In the hands of low-profit clone makers, it ceased to be
merely a business machine with a few home users. Like some strange weed,
PC was mutating and spreading rapidly into the home market. IBM had
created the ultimate computer virus: basically, an Intel-based 'Apple II'
which neither it nor any other single manufacturer could control.

     Once the clone PC propagated into the massive home user market, it
became a creature of this market responding with AdLib Sound, VGA
graphics, low-cost mass storage, etc., AND mushrooming support from major
suppliers of entertainment software. PC is a textbook case of free-market
capitalism in action.

     It may be understandable that Apple, Commodore, and other major
makers failed to perceive the threat. Look at issues of Byte, InfoWorld,
etc. from this period. The writers seem to be uniformly unaware of both
the importance of the home market and the significance of no-name clone
makers.

     Getting back to strategies ... by 1988 it should have been crystal
clear to Apple that 'the competition' was, no longer, IBM, Commodore, or
anyone else. The competition was a platform. And, Apple was warned--
pointedly, in the pages of Computist and, less directly, in magazines like
inCider-- that some move to support its II user base was absolutely
critical.

     In those days, we spoke to Apple in terms of keeping up its "II user
base insurance" because, so long as the home market included hundreds of
thousands of active II users, there would be 'a place to go' the next time
Mac (or whatever) bombed. It was reason enough, though, those first
warnings could have pointed to a much stronger rationale.

     Actually, we did, eventually, 'see it coming' and, again, warn Apple.
Alas, by late 1989, the blow was going to land and that was that.

     It turns out that delivering or, even, just promising to deliver a
New, super, Apple II in 1989 or 1990 was necessary in order to preserve
the still large II user base which, in turn, was necessary because the
Apple II was not, merely, insurance against some future Mac collapse. It
was, in fact, all that stood between PC and, for the first time,
unification of markets around a 'Standard Platform'!

     Even had supporting the II series been a no-profit enterprise in
1989; the II user base was 'worth its weight in gold' as a defense for
Mac. So long as PC was just a popular computer, shoppers could, logically,
choose to go for a Mac (or an Apple II, or a Commodore Amiga, or ...). 

     When, sometime in 1991, the PC became recognized as The Standard
Computer, all other computers became "incompatible". Soon, new software
offerings for the 'other computers' dried up. Peripherals were targeted
for the Standard Computer, too. The positive feedback in this process soon
left non-PC's in the rut of under-supported, over-priced, incompatibility.

     Any sober assessment of Apple's prospects must begin with the
observation that the company's history does not lead one to anticipate
innovative, daring strategems. So, perhaps, we should expect Apple and
Mac-- kicking, screaming, and wailing-- to slide down 'the big tube'
together.

     Still, survival is an excellent motivator. Apple, Inc. may, yet,
adopt a II-based strategy and battle PC for the home market. It's late in
the game; but, when you're dead anyway, you might as well make interesting
moves.


Rubywand