Re: Apple II and God (was Re: Notice to Scott Gamon)

[Rubywand <rubywand@swbell.net>]

Amitai Schlair writes ...
> 
> ....
>
> >      Claiming that just exchanging facts is csa2's only useful interaction
> > function is akin to expressing a concern about balancing ones checkbook when
> > purchasing a computer and, then, once at home, powering-up the new machine to
> > play Tomb Raiders.
> 
> I'm sure this is an apt comparison, but I am unable to decipher its
> meaning. After all, isn't playing a CPU-intensive game as good a way as
> any to verify the quality and speed of the hardware outside the possibly
> subjective frame of the store? ;)
>

     Computer users typically find it difficult to admit that the chief motivation 
for purchasing a machine is to play games. Similarly, some csa2 users prefer to 
mask their true motivations for participation. Evidently, they believe that 
championing the exchange of factual information and devaluing other exchanges 
makes them appear superior.

> ....
>
> the existence of God is [nearly] impossible to argue conclusively either
> way. I've wrestled with it for most of my 18 years and have settled upon
> the conclusion that it doesn't matter. Since the empirical results of
> belief and disbelief are the same, since god-worship dampens the drive
> of the human spirit, and since I philosophically dislike the idea of
> God/gods, I choose to consider Him/them nonexistent and base my
> philosophy on that assumption (among others). ....
> 
> That's where I'm coming from. Even though you don't agree, do I make
> some sort of sense? Please poke gaping holes in any of my philosophical
> errors; that is, after all, how one learns.
>

     Attempting to poke holes might be a fun challenge. Thanks for the invitation.

     Still, it is not anyone's responsibility to bring you, kicking and screaming, 
to a knowledge of and belief in the creator of the universe. If you are 
interested, start at the beginning and read his 'letter'. You could be in for a 
surprise. For help, there are one or two good teachers on TV who cover its 
contents chapter by chapter and verse by verse.    


> .... 

> >      As Toby indicates, Heinlein's opinion is subject to challenge. For
> > example, it is well established that getting to the facts is often easier if
> > the researcher can employ a variety of problem-solving techniques. It is as
> > important to be able to fracture a rapidly converging gestalt-- e.g. via
> > wishful thinking-- as it is to be able to form one.
> 
> I am not familiar with the "gestalt" terminology (could you enlighten
> me?). Therefore I cannot respond usefully to your probably interesting
> assertion. :(
>

     Yes; it is pretty interesting. A gestalt is a grouping of elements, like 
bricks, which becomes a whole, like a wall. Similarly, a collection of ideas can 
become a single idea.

     Effective, creative problem-solving requires both convergent and divergent 
thinking, both the creation and breaking-up of idea structures. If, while working 
on a problem, someone is unable to break up structures, forstall convergence to a 
conclusion, and play with modifications, then, he/she will tend to get stuck in a 
rut.   
 
> >
> >      On the whole, it would be unfair to pick apart Heinlein's statement.
> > Obviously, it is intended to convey an ideal. It is intended to be extreme and
> > to be understood as intended to be extreme.
> 
> And that is the beauty of it! Can you picture a world in which this
> ideal is in universal practice? I, for one, do my best to adhere to a
> similar credo; Nathan, whatever my disagreements with whatever his
> religious beliefs may be, does pretty damn well too.
>

     Accuracy is not always desirable. For example, BASIC's INT() function 
destroys unwanted accuracy. Similarly, in conversations, it is sometimes best to 
avoid crystal clarity in expressing an opinion. 

     When accuracy is desirable, it is, almost always, valuable to know how much 
accuracy is needed. Highly precise calculations and measurements can be very time 
consuming and very costly.

     Absolute accuracy in physical measurements is not possible. So, Heinlein's 
ideal is unobtainable. Anyone who reads the statement is supposed to know that, at 
some point, you have to stop adding decimal places. 

     The Heinlein quote is the kind of advice the crusty old reseacher might give 
a group of novices while pounding on the lab table. It is 'over-kill' designed 
more to create an impression than to be taken absolutely literally.

 
> .... If one chooses ideals that are irrational
> and impracticable, i.e., religious teachings and their secular
> outgrowths of "charity" etc., then obviously one is going to encounter a
> sort of peripateia in which this divergence of worlds occurs. It's
> entirely self-wrought. Because I reject those ideals, I haven't
> encountered any such problems other than the deadening numerical
> majority of my philosophical opponents. Sometimes that's hard... but I'm
> young and stubborn and I'll make it.
>

     That's the old stuff!

     As for the irrationality of religious teachings: in the context of the 
current discussion, this is a 'straw man'. Feel free to burn it to ashes.

     Religions are man-made structures. It is to be expected that they will 
incorporate errors and, sometimes, propagate silly ideas.

     The truths revealed by the creator are not supposed to be a religion. What is 
true is true. To the extent that man's methods can present an accurate picture of 
what is, to that extent there will be no disagreement with the truth. 


>
> > > I read somewhere a very interesting point: most of us in today's society
> > > have no empirical evidence for believing that the world is round. ....
> ....
>
> >      Probably, you now wish that you had not written the above. A .... TV view 
> > of Earth from the Shuttle are pretty good empirical evidence that the Earth is 
> > "round". To seriously question such evidence is to believe in a conspiracy of 
> > truly amazing proportions.
> 
> Not at all; I'm just being extremely literal. I'm pretty sure the Earth
> is round, and certainly a conspiracy to make people think the world is
> round is immeasurably improbable. Nevertheless, I have not seen the
> planet shrink from my view as I recede from the ground in a rocket, so
> strictly speaking I cannot be certain. That's all I meant by the example
> (originally propounded by George Bernard Shaw, then reexamined by Neil
> Postman, BTW).
>

     If you believe that the probability of an "earth is round" conspiracy is 
virtually zero, you should require no direct experience at all to be as certain of 
the earth's roundhood as you are certain of anything you can perceive with your 
senses. Strictly speaking, the fact that everyone says that the earth is round is 
_better_ evidence than anything your senses might tell you when departing Earth in 
a space ship.

>
> .... 
> What I tried to write (but clearly didn't explain very well) is that
> asserting "nothing is true", one is assuming by use of logic that one's
> own statement is true, and therefore the assertion is false. .... that's what I 
> meant when I wrote that you've all probably heard it before. Not a scintillating 
> refutation of relativism, but it suffices for a quickie. :p
>

     Any reasonably cohesive philosophy can defend itself against such attacks. 
For example, were you to meet Toby and say that the "nothing is true" statement 
involves a logical contradiction, he could reply: "See, even logic isn't true!"


 
> Along the same lines, a brain-teaser:
> 
> Is the answer to this question "No"?
>

     No; it is "Yes".


Rubywand